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POSTPETITION LENDING UNDER SECTION 364: 
ISSUES REGARDING THE GAP PERIOD AND 
FINANCING FOR PREPACKAGED PLANS 
Paul M. Baisier* 
David G. Epstein** 
INTRODUCTION 
A company in bankruptcy is not generally viewed as the ideal bor-
rower. Most lenders are understandably reluctant to extend credit to such 
a business. This reluctance compounds the difficulties of a Chapter 11 
business debtor. Without new financing, the cash needs of a company in 
bankruptcy will often cause a Chapter 11 business to be closed or liqui-
dated, thereby foreclosing any hope of reorganization and defeating the 
rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code).1 
To counter the understandable reluctance of financial institutions to 
lend to Chapter 11 debtors,2 section 364 of the Code provides incentives3 
to lenders to provide financing to borrowers who are the subject of bank-
ruptcy cases. Section 364 enables a debtor in a bankruptcy case to obtain 
credit'' by granting a prospective lender a variety of different incentives, 
* King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990; B.S., University 
of Illinois, 1987. 
** King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia; LL.B., University of Texas 1966; B.A. Univer-
sity of Texas, 1964. Although the authors regularly practice in the area of insolvency and 
commercial disputes, they are not currently advocating the positions espoused herein on 
behalf of any of their clients. 
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988), as amended by 11 U.S.C.A §§ 100-1330 (West Supp. 
1991); all sections referred to herein are of tlie Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2. The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that a Chapter 11 debtor will continue to oper-
ate its business and manage its own affairs. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1988). This is true 
in both voluntary and involuntary Chapter 11 cases. A Chapter 11 debtor in such a situation 
is called a "debtor-in-possession." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988). Although the Code permits the 
appointment of an independent trustee in a Chapter 11 case to run the business where 
fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement is alleged, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1108 (1988), it is 
generally difficult to satisfy the standards for trustee appointment. By contrast, a trustee is 
automatically appointed in a voluntary Chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1988). In an 
involuntary Chapter 7, the trustee is not appointed until an order for relief is entered. 11 
U.S.C. § 701 (1988). A Chapter 7 trustee is authorized to operate the business during the 
liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1988). 
3. It can, of course, be argued that there should not be incentives to lend to companies 
in bankruptcy. Laurence Kallen, a Chicago bankruptcy attorney, has described Chapter 11 
as a "monster" because "the bankruptcy system diverts scarce assets such as capital to inef-
ficient producers, thereby allowing them to remain in existence at an added expense to soci-
ety." LAURENCE KALLEN, CORPORATE WELFARE 465, 467 (1991). 
4. Although § 364 is entitled "Obtaining Credit," it is not the only statutory basis that 
c~ be used by a Chapter 11 business debtor to obtain credit. Chapter 11 business debtors 
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some of which are not available on a nonconsensual basis outside of the 
bankruptcy context. 5 Section 364 is set out below: 
(a} If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor 
under section 721, 1108, 1304, 1203, or 1204 of this title, unless the 
court orders otherwise, the trustee may obtain unsecured credit and in-
cur unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business allowable under 
section 503(b}(l} of this title as an administrative expense. 
(b} The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to 
obtain unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other than under 
subsection (a} of this section, allowable under section 503(b}(l} of this 
title as an administrative expense. 
(c} If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under 
section 503(b}(l} of this title as an administrative expense, the court, 
after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the 
incurring of debt-
(1} with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the 
kind specified in section 503(b} or 507(b} of this title; 
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not other-
wise subject to a lien; or 
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is sub-
ject to a lien. 
(d} (1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the ob-
taining of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal 
lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if-
(A} the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and 
(B} there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of 
the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or 
equal lien is proposed to be granted. . 
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of 
proof on the issue of adequate protection. 
(e} The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization 
under this section to obtain credit or incur debt, or of a grant 
under this section of a priority or a lien, does not affect the valid-
ity of any debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to 
an entity that extended such credit in good faith, whether or not 
generally look first to § 363(c), which governs the use of cash collateral. By complying with § 
363(c)(2), a debtor can use the cash it receives from the postpetition sale of inventory or the 
postpetition collection of accounts even though the inventory or accounts are the collateral 
of some prepetition lender. Section 363(c)(2)(B) provides a method for making a prepetition 
lender into an involuntary postpetition lender. See generally Stephen A. Stripp, Balancing 
of Interests in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 562 (1991); Stephen C. Mount, Note, Standards and Sanctions for the Use of 
Cash Collateral Under the Bankruptcy Code, 63 TEx. L. REV. 341 (1984). The use of the 
cash collateral alone, however, is rarely sufficient to meet the cash needs of a debtor over the 
course of a Chapter 11 case. 
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c)(l), 364(d) (1988). Even greater incentives can be provided to 
a lender that already has funds at risk with the debtor. Extending postpetition financing 
often provides a petition lender with an opportunity to enhance the security of its at-risk 
prepetition funds. Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in 
Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 109, 42-44 (1986). 
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such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such au-
thorization and the incurring of such debt, or the granting of such 
priority or lien, were stayed pending appeal. 
(f) Except with respect to an entity that is an underwriter as de-
fined in section 1145(b) of this title, section 5 of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77e), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (15 
U.S.C. 77aaa et seq.), and any State or local law requiring regis-
tration for other or sale of a security or registration or licensing of 
an issuer of, underwriter of, or broker or dealer in, a security does 
not apply to the offer or sale under this section of a security that 
is not an equity security. 6 
105 
The starting point for analyzing postpetition financing is section 
364(a). It provides that a debtor may obtain unsecured credit in the ordi-
nary course of business without approval of the bankruptcy court. This 
treatment is consistent with the Chapter 11 concept of the "debtor-in-
possession," which allows the debtor to continue to operate its business in 
the ordinary course of business.7 To qualify under section 364(a), the 
credit must fund an expense that is otherwise eligible for treatment as an 
administrative expense under section 503(b). To be so eligible, the credit 
must be extended to fund an expense that is an "actual, necessary cost[] 
[or] expense[] of preserving the estate .... "8 
A consequence of the requirement that the credit be extended in the 
"ordinary course of business" is that the financing provided under section 
364(a) is usually limited to trade credit. Other lenders do not generally 
rely on this section, as whether extensions of credit are made "in the ordi-
nary course of business" is a fact-based question that is not always easily 
answerable. Moreover, section 364(b) provides a safer method for credi-
tors who desire to extend postpetition unsecured credit. Section 364(b) 
effectively eliminates the need to make the difficult determination of 
whether a particular credit is made in the "ordinary course of business." 
Section 364(b) allows the postpetition debtor to obtain unsecured credit 
outside of the ordinary course of business. However, Section 364(b) re-
quires the approval of the bankruptcy court after notice and a hearing. 9 
Often, a Chapter 11 business debtor cannot obtain sufficient credit to 
maintain business operations on an unsecured basis. Consequently, sec-
tions 364(c) and (d) allow the debtor to offer lenders positions with prior-
ity over administrative expenses (called secured or supersecured 
positions) to obtain credit. More specifically, section 364(c) empowers the 
debtor to grant a postpetition lender (1) a priority over all administrative 
expenses of the case, 10 (2) a security interest in unencumbered property 
6. 11 u.s.c. § 364 (1988). 
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(l). 
8. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A). 
9. For those extending credit other than clearly extended in the ordinary course of 
business, this is the prudent manner in which to proceed. 
10. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(l) (1988). For the relevance of such a priority over administra-
tive expenses, see Appendix A. 
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of the debtor,11 or (3) a junior lien on already encumbered property.12 
Lending under section 364(c) often involves the grant of more than one of 
these incentives (i.e., a junior lien and priority over administrative ex-
penses for any deficiency in the security). Section 364(c), like section 
364(b), requires court approval after notice and hearing. Further, to be 
granted the priorities provided for in section 364(c), a debtor must prove 
to the court that it cannot obtain the needed credit on an unsecured 
basis.13 
If the priorities provided by section 364(c) are insufficient to entice 
potential lenders to provide sufficient :financing to a Chapter 11 debtor, 
the debtor may, with the court's approval, obtain credit by granting the 
lender a lien on property of the debtor that is senior to existing liens on 
such property (a "priming lien"). The granting of such a priming lien, 
however, is subject to several statutory conditions. First, as with section 
364(c), the debtor must prove that it cannot obtain credit on any less 
intrusive basis (i.e., through the use of section 364(a), (b), or (c)).14 Sec-
ond, the debtor must prove that the interest of any lender whose interest 
is to be primed is "adequately protected."111 Although adequate protection 
can be provided in any number of ways, 16 debtors attempting to utilize 
section 364(a) usually claim that the prime lender's interest is adequately 
protected by a substantial "equity cushion"17 in the property. 
11. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2) (1988). 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(3) (1988). 
13. For a discussion of § 364(c), see In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 37-40 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re St. Mary Hosp., 86 B.R. 393, 401-02 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). 
14. 11 u.s.c. § 364(d)(l) (1988). 
15. 11 u.s.c. § 364(d)(2) (1988). 
16. 11 U.S.C. § 361 sets out examples of adequate protection. It provides: 
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363 or 364 of this title 
of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be pro-
vided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash pay-
ments to such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of 
this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant 
of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in the value 
of such entity's interest in such property; 
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the ex-
tent that such stay, use, sale, lease or grant results in a decrease in the 
value of such entity's interest in such property; or 
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to com-
pensation allowable under section 503(b)(l) of this title as an adminis-
trative expense, as will result in the realization by such entity of the 
indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property. 
11 u.s.c. § 361 (1988). 
17. Id. An equity cushion exists as to any secured creditor if the value of a secured 
creditor's collateral exceeds the amount of its debt plus any debt with priority over its debt. 
There have been relatively few reported cases under § 364(d). Most of the reported cases 
granting § 364(d) financing have held that the prepetition lender is adequately protected by 
an equity cushion. For a discussion of the protection offered by the equity cushion, see In re 
Snowshoe Co., 789 F.2d 1085, 1188-90 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Dunes Casino Hotel, 69 B.R. 
784, 795-96 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). However, it is far more common for a Chapter 11 debtor 
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Finally, lenders who have advanced funds based on court orders 
granted under section 364 are protected on appeal by section 364(e).18 
Chapter 11 debtors generally have an immediate need for postpetition 
financing. Creditors would be reluctant to advance funds if a section 
364(b) or (c) priority or a section 364(c) or (d) lien could be removed by 
the reversal on appeal of the order granting the priority or lien. Conse-
quently, section 364 lenders are protected from reversal on appeal by sec-
tion 364(e), provided that the order granting the priority or lien was 
sought in good faith10 and provided that a stay pending the appeal was 
not obtained by a party opposing the grant of the priority or lien.20 
I. IssUEs RELATED To PosTPETITION FINANCING 
There are numerous books and articles that provide a more compre-
hensive overview of debtor-in-possession financing and the issues raised 
by such financing.21 Rather than attempt to duplicate those facts here, 
this article will instead answer two specific questions regarding postpeti-
tion financing that have been raised by recent cases: (1) may the debtor, 
in the context of a "prepackaged" bankruptcy, establish an arrangement, 
prior to its filing, for postpetition financing that will be binding on the 
lender postpetition; and (2) may an involuntary debtor utilize section 364 
to obtain financing during the "gap period" between the filing of an invol-
untary petition and the entry of an order for relief? 
II. SECURING FINANCING IN A PREPACKAGED BANKRUPTCY FILING 
Perhaps the most significant bankruptcy development of the early 
1990's has been the use of prepackaged bankruptcy plans.22 A prepack-
to use the threat of § 364(d) to persuade prepetition lenders to extend postpetition credit 
than it is for a Chapter 11 debtor to use § 364(d) to persuade a bankruptcy judge to grant a 
priming lien to a new postpetition lender. Can a debtor make a realistic § 364(d) threat to a 
lender who does not have an equity cushion? Is an equity cushion essential to satisfy the 
"adequate protection" requirement of § 364(d)? Consider the following example. D owes S 
$1,000,000. S's collateral has a value of $800,000. No equity cushion. D needs $300,000 in 
postpetition financing. D's appraiser is prepared to testify that the infusion of this addi-
tional $300,000 will increase the value of S's collateral from $800,000 to $1,250,000. If a 
court accepts this appraisal, is not S adequately protected, notwithstanding the absence of 
an equity cushion? Is it not arguable that a debtor can establish adequate protection by 
establishing that each dollar of the priming loan will enhance the value of the prepetition 
lender's collateral by at least a dollar. Judge Scholl explains the argument more eloquently 
in In re Aqua Associates, 123 B.R. 192, (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). 
18. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1988). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. See generally 2 ROBERT E. GINSBERG, BANKRUPTCY § 13.06(c) (2d ed. 1989); Mark 
L. Prager, Financing the Chapter 11 Debtor: The Lenders Perspective, 45 Bus. LAW 2127 
(1990). 
22. For a discussion of prepackaged bankruptcy plans, see generally Case & Harwood, 
Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization and Using the Declar-
atory Judgment Act for Instant Reorganizations, 1991 Annual Survey of American Law 
__ ; Richard L. Epling, Exchanges Offers, Defaults, and Insolvency: A Short Primer, 8 
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aged bankruptcy plan is a plan that is negotiated with and accepted23 by 
creditors prior to "the filing of any bankruptcy petition. The Code recog-
nizes creditor acceptances of a Chapter 11 plan obtained prior to the fil-
ing of the Chapter 11 case if the solicitation of the acceptances meets the 
requirements of section 1126.2' These provisions for prepetition solicita-
tion have been a part of the Code sine~ its enactment in 1979. Even prior 
to 1979, prepetition solicitation was possible under Chapter XI of the old 
Bankruptcy Act.25 
Although the prepackaged Chapter 11 plan is not a product created 
in the 1990's, it has proved to be a product created for the 1990's. Lever-
aged buyouts in the 1980's resulted in numerous businesses with too 
much debt. A prepackaged Chapter 11 is often the most efficient way to 
restructure that debt. The primary advantages of a prepackaged Chapter 
11 over an ordinary Chapter 11 are reductions in time in bankruptcy as 
well as business and legal risks from bankruptcy. An ordinary Chapter 11 
can take months if not years to complete, and a debtor in Chapter 11 
faces not only the business risks of loss of customers and suppliers but 
also the legal risk of loss of assets and even loss of control to creditors 
during the course of the Chapter 11. By contrast, prepackaged Chapter 11 
cases have been completed in less than two months.26 Through the use of 
a prepackaged Chapter 11 plan, a business can at least reduce the busi-
ness and legal risks of Chapter 11. 
The primary advantage of a prepackaged Chapter 11, less time in 
bankruptcy, is also its greatest disadvantage. Because a debtor is using a 
BANKR. DEV. J. 15 (1991); Marc S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Plans: The Deleveraging 
Tool of the '90's in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 643 (1991). 
23. It is necessary to distinguish "prepackaged" plans from "prenegotiated" plans. 
Prepackaged plans are plans in which solicitation of creditor and shareholder acceptance of 
the plan occurs prior to the bankruptcy filing. Prenegotiated plans are plans in which the 
structure and perhaps even the language of the plan and disclosure statement are negotiated 
prior to a bankruptcy filing but the actual solicitation of acceptances is delayed until after 
the bankruptcy filing. By "prenegotiating" but not "presoliciting," the plan proponent 
avoids SEC review of its disclosure documents. For a discussion of the avoidance of SEC 
review, see 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) and 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988). For a general discussion of the 
SEC rules governing exchange offers, see Epling, supra note 22, at 18-30. 
24. Section 1126(b) provides: 
For the purpose of subsections (c) and (d) of this section [1126], a holder of a 
claim or interest that has accepted or rejected the plan before the commence-
ment of the case under this title is deemed to have accepted or rejected such 
plan, as the case may be, if-
(1) the solicitation of such acceptance or rejection was in compliance 
with any applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation governing 
the adequacy of disclosure in connection with such solicitation; or 
(2) if there is not any such law, rule, or regulation, such acceptance or 
rejection was solicited after disclosure to such holder of adequate infor-
mation, as defined in section 1125(a)(l) of this title. 
11 u.s.c. § 1126(b) (1988). 
25. See Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1935) cert. denied, 296 
U.S. 581 (1935). 
· 26. In re JPS Textile Group, Case No. 91-B-10546 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (42 days). 
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prepackaged Chapter 11 to spend less time in bankruptcy, a disgruntled 
creditor may attempt to gain concessions by threatening to take action 
that will delay the confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan. One type of cred-
itor that arguably has the power to impede the progress of a prepackaged 
Chapter 11 in this way is a party that has agreed prepetition to provide 
the debtor with postpetition financing. 
In answering the question of whether a creditor can delay the 
prepackaged Chapter 11, it is necessary to consider two provisions of the 
Code-sections 364 and 365. Section 364 has already been summarized.27 
Section 365 deals with leases and executory contracts.28 It generally em-
powers a debtor to assume executory contracts subject to court approval. 
The Code does not expressly deal with the consequences of assumption of 
an executory contract.29 However, it is clear from the cases that assump-
tion gives (1) the debtor the right to enforce the contract against the 
other party, and (2) the other party the right to collect amounts due and 
owing under the contract, both prepetition and postpetition, as an admin-
istrative expense priority claim. 30 
A debtor can assume a contract even though the other party to the 
contract objects, and even though the contract expressly provides for ter-
mination on a bankruptcy filing.31 Accordingly, if a Chapter 11 debtor can 
invoke section 365 and assume a prepetition contract to extend credit 
postpetition, the answer to the question is "No" because a debtor can 
27. For a discussion of§ 364, see supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text. 
28. There is no statutory definition of an executory contract. In what is undoubtedly 
the most widely cited law review article on a bankruptcy topic, Professor Countryman re-
viewed the case law under the 1898 Act on executory contracts and synthesized the cases 
into the following definition: "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt 
and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to 
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance by the 
other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 
439, 460 (1973). Most reported cases under § 365 use the Countryman definition. See, e.g., 
Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 
(4th Cir. 1984). 
29. Section 365(b)(l) is perhaps the most helpful provision. It sets out the require-
ments for assumption of a contract if there has been a default. 
If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of 
the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time 
of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will 
promptly cure, such default; 
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will 
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such con-
tract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting 
from such default; and 
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such 
contract or lease. 
11 U.S.C. 365(b)(l) (1988). Note that § 365(b)(l) does not apply if the debtor is not in 
default. 
30. See Don Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy 
Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341, 376 (1980). For the relevancy of such a priority, see Appendix A. 
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 365(e) (1988). 
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require the chosen postpetition lender to extend credit postpetition on 
terms agreed to prepetition. 
However, section 365(c) identifies categories of executory contracts 
that cannot be assumed. Section 365(c)(2) thus arguably prevents the 
debtor from assuming a prepetition contract for postpetition financing. It 
provides: 
the trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease 
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if . . . 
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt 
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the 
debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor.32 
An agreement to provide postpetition financing is clearly a contract 
"to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommoda-
tions to or for the benefit of the debtor," and thus such contracts would 
seem to be nonassumable under section 365(c)(2).33 
Additionally, section 364 is perhaps relevant. Congress purported it 
would govern "all obtaining of credit and incurring of debt by the es-
tate. "3' If this precludes the application of section 365 to prepetition con-
tracts for postpetition credit, then a debtor cannot hold the lender to the 
contract by assumption. These two legal provisions, sections 365(c)(2) 
and 364, allow the postpetition lender to argue that its prepetition agree-
ment to provide financing to the debtor is unenforceable by the debtor 
postpetition. 311 This article will evaluate this argument in light of the 
structure of the Code and recent case law. 
A contract to extend postpetition financing is an executory contract, 
regardless of the definition of the term that is employed. 38 A Chapter 11 
debtor generally has until the confirmation of its plan of reorganization to 
assume, reject, or assume and assign an executory contract,37 subject to 
the nondebtor party's ability to request that the court shorten that 
time.38 The decision to assume or reject is reviewable by the bankruptcy 
32. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1988). 
33. Section 365(e)(2) would also allow the lender to terminate such a contract on the 
basis of an ipso facto clause contained in the contract; however, in the context of a prepack-
aged bankruptcy, a putative debtor seeking postpetition financing would not likely allow the 
insertion of a clause that would permit the termination of the contract in a situation that is 
explicitly contemplated to occur. 
34. H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 345-47 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; SR REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d. Seas. 57-58 (1978). 
35. Thus, they may provide that lender with the ability to extract additional profits 
from the debtor, who is anxious to expedite its prepackaged bankruptcy. As the postpetition 
lender is often a prepetition lender of the debtor, this extortion may be in the form of 
additional interest on the postpetition borrowing or, instead, in the form of some special 
treatment of its prepetition claim. As to the propriety of the latter, see generally Tabb, 
supra note 5. · 
36. For the Countryman definition of an executory contract, see supra note 28. 
37. 11 u.s.c. § 365(d)(2) (1988). 
38. Id. 
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court under a "business judgment" standard. 39 
As noted previously, the Chapter 11 debtor has no power to assume 
or reject a prepetition contract if the contract is one "to make a loan, or 
extend other debt financing or financial accommodation to or for the ben-
efit of the debtor,"'0 as section 365(c)(2) precludes assumption of such 
contracts. The purpose of the subsection is to "prevent the trustee from 
requiring new advances of money or other property."n Section 365(c)(2) 
appears to have been designed to protect lenders from having to continue 
to fund the debtor postpetition under a prepetition financing agreement. 
Assume, for example, that C Bank agreed to extend a $1,000,000 line of 
credit to D Inc. on January 15. On July 15, D Inc. filed for bankruptcy. D 
Inc. then attempted to draw on the line of credit. Under section 365(c)(2), 
D Inc. could not use the assumption of the executory contract to compel 
C Bank to extend postpetition financing pursuant to the terms of the 
prepetition contract. 42 
A question not answered by section 365(c)(2) is whether D Inc. 
should be able to draw on the line of credit if C Bank agrees? Another 
issue is whether D Inc. should be able to draw on the line of credit if C 
Bank and D Inc. entered into this "financial accommodation" contract in 
anticipation of D Inc.'s bankruptcy filing? The language of section 
365(c)(2) provides no explicit exception for the assumption of contracts to 
extend financial accommodations either with the consent of the lender or 
in situations in which the contract was entered into explicitly for the pur-
pose of providing postpetition financing. The absence of exceptions for 
these two situations bolsters the position of the chosen postpetition 
lender in attempting to avoid its contracts and generally puts at issue the 
assumability of prepetition contracts to provide postpetition financing in 
the context of a prepackaged bankruptcy. Two recent cases, In re Sun 
Runner Marine, Inc:'3 and In re T.S. Industries Inc.,44 consider these 
issues. 
In Sun Runner, the debtor moved to assume a prepetition financing 
agreement with Transamerica."11 Under the contract, Transamerica ad-
vanced funds to retailers who sold boats manufactured by the debtor, and 
the debtor, in turn, agreed to buy the boats back from Transamerica for 
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 
(1984); but cf. In re Food City, Inc., 94 B.R. 91, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1988). 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1988). 
41. H.R REP. No. 595 at 348. 
42. In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991). See also In re Tay-
lor Freezers of Alabama, Inc., 115 B.R. 333, 335 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (holding that if 
contract had provided for credit sales, it would be a contract for financial accommodations 
that could not be assumed); In re Placid Oil Co., 72 B.R. 135, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 1987) 
(holding that a § 365(c)(2) contract cannot be assumed); In re Swift Aire Lines, 30 B.R. 490, 
496-97 (9th Cir. 1983). 
43. 116 B.R. 712 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), atf'd in part, vacated in part, 945 F.2d 1089 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
44. 117 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990). 
45. Sun Runner, 116 B.R. at 714. 
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the outstanding balance of the loan in the event a dealer defaulted.46 Cit-
icorp, a major secured and unsecured creditor in the case, objected to the 
assumption of the contract, as assumption would have elevated over 
$124,000 in prepetition claims of Transamerica to administrative expense 
status.47 The bankruptcy court allowed the assumption.48 The Bank-
ruptcy Appeals Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP) reversed on two 
grounds. First, the BAP held that the agreement was not an executory 
contract. 49 Second, the BAP found that the contract was one for financial 
accommodation and was thus nonassumable, even with the consent of the 
lender.Go On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the BAP opinion on the 
executory contract issue and relied exclusively on the second ground. In 
affirming the BAP, the Ninth Circuit adopted the BAP opinion on the 
section 365(c)(2) issue in its entirety.G1 
The BAP analysis of section 365(c)(2) involved two other sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code: section 364 and section 365(c)(l). As to section 
364, Judge Volinn concluded that a prepetition contract for postpetition 
financing is "governed solely by section 364."G2 In so concluding, he com-
pared the effect on unsecured creditors of the application of sections 364 
and 365: 
Section 364 does not, however, authorize the debtor to pay the lender's 
pre-petition unsecured claim as a condition precedent to the post-peti-
tion financing. Permitting the assumption of a financial accommodation 
contract would allow a post-petition lender, such as Transamerica in 
this case, to receive full payment on its pre-petition unsecured claim 
under § 365(b)(l). This benefit to the lender would be at the expense of 
the other unsecured creditors, such as Citibank in this case, because it 
would diminish the estate assets available to satisfy their claims. Thus 
the § 365(c)(2) prohibition against the assumption of financial accom-
modation contracts protects all unsecured creditors, not just the lender, 
and the lender's consent alone is not sufficient to abrogate it. ~3 
Although section 364 does not expressly provide for the payment of 
· prepetition debts, there is case law under section 364 sustaining the grant 
of liens on postpetition assets to secure prepetition debts as a part of a 
postpetition financing package.G4 Judge Volinn acknowledged this line of 
cases on "cross-collateralization" and the argument that the cross-col-
lateralization cases, by analogy, supported the payment of prepetition 
claims that would result from assumption under section 365. GG He then 
concluded that such an argument wa8 not before the BAP as it had not 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 715. 
49. Id. at 716. 
50. Id. at 717. 
51. Sun Runner, 945 F.2d 1089. 
52. Sun Runner, 116 B.R. at 717-18. 
53. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
54. See, e.g., In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1097-98 (2d Cir. 1979). 
55. Sun· Runner, 116 B.R. at 719. 
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been made to or considered by the bankruptcy court.116 
The BAP opinion in Sun Runner also dealt with section 365(c)(l). 
The section provides: 
The trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease 
prohibits or restricts ·assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if-
(l)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to 
such contract or lease from accepting performance from or ren-
dering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the 
debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease pro-
hibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties. G7 
Notice that the prohibition of section 365(c)(l) is limited by consent. 
Judge Volinn noticed that limitation and commented on it brie:fly.118 The 
explicit consent exception in section 365(c)(l) is probably the strongest 
argument against implying a consent exception in section 365(c)(2). 
Under accepted principles of statutory construction: 
1. A Code should be construed as a whole119-what section 365(c)(l) 
does say is relevant in interpreting what section 365(c)(2) does not say; 
2. The inclusion of a consent exception in section 365(c)(l) indicates 
that Congress could and would expressly provide for consent where it so 
intended. 60 
This argument is bolstered by the legislative history of section 
365(c)(2). In the original House version of the section, contracts currently 
covered by section 365(c)(2) were covered by what is now section 
365(c)(l) and thus were subject to an express consent exception.61 From 
that it can be argued that the division was made to bar assumption of 
contracts to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial ac-
commodations, even if the other party to the contract consents. 
It also has been argued that lender assent should be irrelevant to 
assumption under section 365(c)(2) because section 365(c)(2) protects un-
secured creditors as well as the contracting party.62 Although the argu-
ment has been made in cases and commentary, it does not appear 
anywhere in the legislative history of section 365(c)(2). 
There are, however, cases which hold that a prepetition contract that 
extends credit postpetition can be assumed if the creditor consents. For 
example, in In re Prime,63 the bankruptcy court held that consent of the 
56. Id. at 719-20. 
57. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(l). 
58. Sun Runner, 116 B.R. at 717. 
59. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 46.05 (4th ed. 
1984). 
60. Id. 
61. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 365 (1978). 
62. Sun Runner, 116 B.R. at 718; In re Placid Oil Co., 72 B.R. 135, 136 (Bankr. N.D. 
Texas 1987); Thomas R. Slome, Assuming Pre-Petition Workout Agreements under Section 
365: The "Workout Decade" Begins with Innovation, 3 Bankr. L. Rptr. (BNA) No. 4, at 
104, 105 (Jan. 24, 1991). 
63. 15 B.R. 216, 219 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). 
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lender abrogates the effect of section 365(c)(2). Other courts, in dicta, 
have agreed with this conclusion.6' Similarly, in In re Easebe,6G the Ninth 
Circuit recognized that lenders could waive their rights under section 
365(c)(2). More particularly, the court found that "because there is no 
provision in the bankruptcy code precluding it, [section 365(c)(2)] can be 
waived 'by those for whose benefit it has been enacted.' "66 
We :find it inappropriate to imply a consent exception in applying 
section 365(c)(2). Although we believe that the absolute prohibition on 
assumption of loans, debt :financing, and :financial accommodation con-
tracts should be tempered by a consent of the creditor exception, we do 
not believe that it is now. We are persuaded by the argument in Sun 
Runner based on the comparison of section 365(c)(l) and section 
365(c)(2). The explicit inclusion of a consent exception in section 
365(c)(l), coupled with the division of section 365(c) into two subpara-
graphs, means that a consent exception should not be implied in section 
365(c)(2). If section 365(c)(2) applies to a prepetition contract for postpe-
tition :financing, then the debtor should not be able to assume that con-
tract even if the lender consents. 67 
Although we do not question how section 365(c)(2) should apply, we 
do question whether, in certain circumstances, section 365(c)(2) should 
apply. At least, we question whether section 365(c)(2) should apply in 
prepackaged cases or other situations in which the prepetition contract 
for postpetition :financing was negotiated and consummated in explicit 
contemplation of a bankruptcy :filing. Judge Clark dealt with this ques-
tion in In re T.S. Industries.68 
In T.S. Industries, the debtor entered into a restructuring agreement 
with its major creditors and new investors prior to the :filing of its bank-
ruptcy petition. 69 The agreement included a restructuring of the debtor's 
credit line with Credit Suisse. After filing its petition, the debtor decided 
to renege on the agreement and moved to reject it, claiming that it was a 
contract to provide :financial accommodation and was thus nonassumable 
64. In re Charrington Worldwide Enters., Inc., 98 B.R. 65, 68 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), 
aff'd 110 B.R. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977, 988 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). 
65. 900 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990). 
66. Id. (quoting Cukierman v. Mechanics Bank of Richmond (In re J. F. Hink & Son), 
815 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987)). The language quoted from the Easbe court is taken 
from its analogy to waiver of rights under § 365(f)(3). 
67. Even if a consent exception exists for§ 365(c)(2), it will be helpful to the potential 
debtor seeking to lock in postpetition financing for a prepackaged bankruptcy filing only if 
prepetition consent is sufficient basis. If postpetition consent is required, the lender will still 
have the right to threaten to slow up the prepackaged process by withholding its consent 
and thereby extort additional amounts from the debtor. Further, requiring postpetition con-
sent would effectively moot the exception, as a debtor and a consenting postpetition lender 
could simply reexecute their prepetition agreement postpetition and proceed under § 364. 
There are no cases under § 365(c)(l) regarding the timing of the required consent. 
68. 117 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990). 
69. Id. at 684. 
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and had to be rejected.70 The debtor was joined in this effort by all of the 
parties to the agreement.71 The Unsecured Creditors Committee opposed 
the motion, as it was proposing: a plan of reorganization that included the 
assumption of the agreement.72 
The T.S. Industries analysis of the motion to reject began with an 
overview of the assumption and rejection process under section 365 and 
the relevance of section 365(c)(2) therein.73 Judge Clark determined from 
the legislative history of the Code that section 365(c)(2) was passed to 
protect lenders from being forced to lend to bankrupt debtors.74 He also 
noted a commentator's view that the section was designed to allow lend-
ers to reassess the credit risk of lending to the debtor in light of an actual 
bankruptcy, as bankruptcy would typically only have been a possibility 
when the lending originally took place.75 
Judge Clark concluded that the agreement reached by T.S. Industries 
and its creditors was not covered by section 365(c)(2) because it was not 
"the type of agreement that was contemplated as being barred from as-
sumption under [section] 365(c)(2),"76 and added "[i]f ... the ... 
[a]greement is a nonassumable executory contract under [section] 
365(c)(2), it would render meaningless all future prepetition contracts to 
extend the debtor post-confirmation financial accommodations."77 T.S. 
Industries thus found that the prepetition contract to extend postpetition 
financing was assumable notwithstanding section 365(c)(2) and denied 
the debtor's motion to reject premised on its nonassumability. 
It is clear that the T.S. Industries decision is not consistent with the 
"plain meaning" rule that has been popular in bankruptcy jurisprudence 
since the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enter-
prises. 78 It is less clear whether the T.S. Industries decision is consistent 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 684-85. 
72. Id. at 685. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 686. 
75. Id. at 686-87. On this point, Judge Clark cites an extensive passage from Raymond 
T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of 
the Bargain, 54 U. CoLO. L. REV. 504, 533-34, 536 (1983). 
76. T.S. Industries, 117 B.R. at 687. 
77. Id. at 689. 
78. 489 U.S. 235 (1989); see generally Falk, Ron Pair Enterprises: Supreme Court 
Finds Ouersecured Creditors Entitled to Postpetition Interest, 1 FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANK-
RUPTCY LAW REV. 9 (Summer 1989). Ron Pair has reduced significantly bankruptcy courts' 
use of legislative history in interpreting the provisions of the Code. The Ron Pair Court held 
that § 506(b) changed pre-Code case law so that a nonconsensual lien creditor is entitled to 
postpetition interest on its claim. Justice Blackmun based this holding on "the plain mean-
ing" of § 506(b). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion contained a number of statements 
about construing the Code that are now regularly quoted by bankruptcy courts in rejecting 
arguments based on legislative history and pre-Code case law. 
Initially, it is worth recalling that Congress worked on the formulation of the 
Code for nearly a decade. It was intended to modernize the bankruptcy laws 
.... In such a substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or real-
istic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took. 
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with the decision in Sun Runner. In comparing the Sun Runner and T.S. 
Industries decisions, it is important to look at the differences in facts and 
the differences in the questions presented. In Sun Runner, the debtor 
and other party to the contract were seeking continuation of a contract, 
entered into before bankruptcy was even contemplated, over the objec-
tion of other creditors. 79 To protect these other creditors, the BAP looked 
to section 365(c)(2) and reversed the bankruptcy court's approval of as-
sumption.80 T.S. Industries involved very different facts and presented 
different questions. In T.S. Industries, the other creditors were seeking 
continuation of a contract entered into in contemplation of bankruptcy 
over the objection of the debtor and the other parties to the contract.81 
Again acting to protect the other creditors, the court looked to section 
365(c)(2) and concluded that it should not apply to contracts entered into 
in contemplation of the bankruptcy.82 
We agree with the rule, if not the holding and reasoning, of T.S. In· 
dustries. A debtor who files a prepackaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy should 
be able to enforce contracts it entered into on the eve of its bankruptcy to 
provide it financing in that bankruptcy. Section 365(c)(2) should not pre-
vent the debtor from enforcing such contracts. As drafted, section 
365(c)(2) should not apply to such contracts; thus, the chosen postpeti-
tion lender in a prepackaged bankruptcy should not be able to slow down 
the prepackage process. The lender should not be allowed to escape its 
prepetition bargain and extort benefits for the prepackaged Chapter 11 
debtor by arguing that section 365(c)(2) prevents assumption of their 
agreement by the debtor. However, such an agreement should be subject 
to approval by the Bankruptcy Court under both section 364 and section 
365. 
Having considered financing for prepackaged bankruptcy filings, we 
now turn to financing in a wholly different setting, one that typically in-
volves far less planning-the involuntary bankruptcy. 
Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there gener-
ally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute. 
The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of§ 506(b) begins where 
all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. In this case 
it is also where the inquiry should end, for where, as here, the statute's language 
is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." 
The language before us expresses Congress' intent-that postpetition interest be 
available-with sufficient precision so that reference to legislative history and to 
pre-Code practice is hardly necessary. 
Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240-41 (citations omitted) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 
U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). . 
79. Sun Runner, 116 B.R. at 714-15. 
80. Id. at 720. 
81. T.S. Industries, 117 B.R. at 684-85. 
82. Id. at 689. 
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III. "GAP PERIOD" FINANCING UNDER SECTION 364 
A bankruptcy case is commenced by the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion.83 This petition can be filed either by a debtor itself or by a number 
of creditors8' of a putative debtor. When the former occurs, the case is 
called a "voluntary" bankruptcy; the latter is termed an "involuntary" 
bankruptcy. This is not a distinction without a difference, as there are 
significant discrepancies in the ability of the debtor to continue operating 
in voluntary and involuntary cases. For example, a voluntary debtor may 
only dispose of property without court approval if such is done in the 
ordinary course of its business815 and the debtor may not use "cash collat-
eral"86 at all without court approval. 87 Also, a voluntary debtor generally 
may not pay its prepetition creditors88 and must file regular financial and 
other reports with the United States Trustee.89 Conversely, an involun-
tary debtor bears none of these burdens; it may instead "continue to op-
erate [its business], and . . . continue to use, acquire or dispose of 
property as if an involuntary case ... had not been commenced."90 
The special status of an involuntary debtor, however, is a temporary 
one. The involuntary debtor must timely91 and successfully controvert the 
petition filed by its creditors. If it does not, the court will enter an order 
for relief92 and the case will proceed, for most purposes, as if it were a 
voluntary case. The period between the filing of the involuntary petition 
and the entry of the order for relief is known as the "gap period." 
The availability of postpetition financing under section 364 is usually 
not an issue in involuntary cases. Most involuntary cases are either dis-
missed or have an order for relief entered fairly quickly, leaving little 
time for an involuntary debtor to seek and obtain postpetition financing. 
Moreover, since involuntary filings are not planned by the debtor, the 
83. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(b) (1988). 
84. Generally speaking, if the debtor has twelve or more creditors, such a petition 
must be filed by at least three creditors whose noncontingent, undisputed unsecured claims 
total more than $5,000. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(l) (1988). Conversely, if the debtor has fewer than 
twelve creditors, any single creditor holding noncontingent, undisputed unsecured claim of 
over $5,000 may file a petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (1988). 
85. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(l), 363(c)(l) (1988). 
86. "Cash collateral" generally refers to cash or cash equivalents, whenever acquired, 
in which an entity other than the debtor's estate has an interest. It includes postpetition 
proceeds, rents and profits of the debtor's prepetition assets that are subject to a security 
interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988). 
87. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988). 
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1988). There is a growing exception to this general rule. In-
creasingly, courts are approving postpetition payments on prepetition obligations to employ-
ees and others on the business, if not legal, theory that such payments are necessary. See 
generally In re Eagle-Piche11- Indus., 124 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Chateau-
gauy Corp., 80 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
89. FED. R BANKR. P. 2015. 
90. 11 u.s.c. § 303(f) (1988). 
91. The petition must be controverted within 20 days. FED. R BANKR. P. lOll(b). 
92. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1988); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1013(b). Despite this, the authors are 
currently involved in a case in which the order for relief was not entered for 155 days. 
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debtor in an involuntary case has not arranged postpetition financing be-
forehand, a practice that is quite common in voluntary filings. 
In those involuntary cases in which the debtor seeks new credit dur-
ing the "gap period," the threshold issue of the ability of an involuntary 
debtor to utilize section 364 is likely to be raised. In those cases, parties 
that object to the involuntary debtor's use of section 364 may claim that, 
as the involuntary debtor has not consented to the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court and acceded to the burdens thereof, it should not be 
granted the benefits of the Code. Conversely, the debtor may argue that 
its access to credit has been impaired by the filing of an unwarranted 
bankruptcy petition against it and, consequently, it should be able to use 
section 364 to restore its prepetition credit status. Neither of these two 
viewpoints is likely correct, and a middle ground between them is the 
most easily supported both by policy and the Code. 
There is only one reported case that expressly deals with the ques-
tion of whether an involuntary debtor can invoke section 364. In that 
case, In re Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture,93 the bankruptcy court faced 
an unusual set of facts. The case had begun as an involuntary Chapter 11 
case in which the debtor needed $120,000 to avoid immediate liquidation. 
An insider had offered to advance the $120,000 and, as a condition of the 
proposed financing, had sought priority over administrative expenses and 
a first priority lien in an unencumbered lease to secure the financing, 
both pursuant to section 364(c).9' The court had granted the debtor's mo-
tion to allow the proposed postpetition financing from the bench, and 
debtor's counsel had offered to present an order for the court's signature 
later in the week.9 G The insider made the loan, but the debtor's counsel 
subsequently failed to deliver the order to the court and failed to have 
the debtor and the lender execute any loan or security documents. Subse-
quently, all of the debtor's assets were sold, the case was converted to a 
Chapter 7 proceeding, and the lender petitioned the bankruptcy court for 
an order nunc pro tune to authorize the financing.96 Faced with the fore-
going, the court determined, notwithstanding its previous grant of the fi-
nancing, not to enter the order authorizing the financing nunc pro tune 
because an involuntary debtor was not authorized to utilize section 
364(C),97 
In so holding, the court first looked at section 364(a), although the 
debtor in Roxy Roller was moving under section 364(c), and made three 
findings specific to section 364(a). The court first noted section 364(a) 
reqµires that in order to borrow under that section, the debtor98 must be 
93. 73 B.R. 521 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
94. Id. at 522-23. 
95. Id. at 523. 
96. Id. at 522. 
97. Id. at 522-23. 
98. The statute literally requires a "trustee" to obtain the financing. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) 
(1988). For a discussion of whether an involuntary debtor has the powers of a "trustee," see 
infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
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operating the business under, inter alia, either section 721 or 1108 of the 
Code.99 Second, the court found that the involuntary debtor's authority to 
operate the business comes from section 303(f) and not from either sec-
tions 721 or 1108.100 Third, the court found that the utilization of section 
364(a) by an involuntary debtor to create an administrative expense pri-
ority for a gap period creditor would bring section 364(a) into direct con-
flict with Sections 502(f) and 507(a)(2), which provide priority directly 
behind administrative expenses for the involuntary debtor's gap period 
"ordinary course" expenses.101 As a consequence of these three findings, 
the Roxy Roller court held that section 364(a) is not available to an invol-
untary debtor.102 
The Roxy Roller court next considered the availability of section 
364(b) to an involuntary debtor. The leading multivolume bankruptcy 
treatise, Collier on Bankruptcy, states that section 364(b) credit is availa-
ble to an involuntary debtor.103 In disagreeing with Collier, the Roxy 
Roller court took issue with the statement that section 502(f) applies only 
to "ordinary course" transactions, and thus does not present a conflict 
with section 364(b) that disqualifies an involuntary debtor from obtaining 
364(b) :financing.10' The Roxy Roller opinion attacked this statement in 
two ways. First, the court stated that section 502(f) provides "[n]o sup-
port" for Collier's assertion.105 Section 502(f) provides ample support for 
such an assertion, as it deals only with "ordinary course" transactions, in 
contrast to section 364(b), which deals with transactions outside the "or-
dinary course." Second, the opinion stated that allowing an involuntary 
debtor to use section 364(b), but not 364(a), made little sense, as there 
was not a "sufficient distinction" between the two sections.106 To the con-
trary, section 364(b) requires court approval, while section 364(a) does 
not. The imposition of the requirement of court approval allows the regu-
lation by the court of these credit extensions. 
In its discussion of section 364(b), the Roxy Roller court also consid-
ered a question critical to the section 364(c) superpriority and the lien 
that the debtor sought: does the involuntary debtor have the status of a 
99. Roxy Roller, 73 B.R. at 526. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Collier states: 
In an involuntary case credit incurred outside the ordinary course of business 
before entry of the order for relief must be authorized by the court under section 
364(b). Such credit is entitled to priority as an expense of administration under 
Section 503(b)(l). Section 502(f) applies only to credit obtained in the ordinary 
course of business during the so-called involuntary gap period, and therefore will 
not disqualify credits authorized under section 364(b) from priority under Sec-
tions 503(b)(l) and 507(a)(l). 
WILLIAM M COLLIER, 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, lJ 364.03 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds, 15th 
ed. 1991). 
104. Roxy Roller, 73 B.R. at 526. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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"trustee" during the gap period? Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of section 
364 use the term "trustee." An involuntary debtor can make use of these 
paragraphs only if she has the status of a "trustee." On that question, the 
Roxy Rpller court held that, although section 1107 equates the powers of 
a debtor-in-possession with those of a trustee, and an involuntary debtor 
is a debtor-in-possession,1°7 the involuntary debtor could not be a trustee, 
as its freedom to operate under Section 303(f) was inconsistent with the 
obligations of a "trustee."108 Having concluded that an involuntary debtor 
is not a "trustee," the Roxy Roller court held that neither section 364(b) 
nor section 364(c) was available to an involuntary debtor and, conse-
quently, denied the debtor's motion for an order nunc pro tunc.100 
The Roxy Roller holding that an involuntary debtor is not a "trus-
tee" for purposes of section 364 seems inconsistent with the language of 
section 101(12), section 1101, and section 1107. Section 101(12) defines 
"debtor" as an entity against which a case has been "commenced." It 
does not explicitly limit the definition of debtor to an entity that has 
commenced a case itself. Section 1101 makes any "debtor" a "debtor-in-
possession" unless a trustee has been appointed. Finally, section 1107 al-
lows a "debtor-in-possession" to utilize all the rights of a "trustee." Fol-
lowing this analysis, an involuntary debtor is a "trustee" and can borrow 
under sections 364(b), (c) and (d).110 
Allowing an involuntary debtor to utilize sections 364(b), (c) and (d), 
is consistent not only with the language of the Code but also with funda-
mental considerations of fair play and equity. An involuntary debtor has 
been thrust into bankruptcy against its will. Its credit is likely to be dam-
aged, if not destroyed. Its cash needs will increase, as all of its suppliers 
are likely to continue transactions only upon a cash on delivery basis. It is 
not fair to ask the involuntary debtor to shoulder these burdens while not 
allowing it to obtain any sort of financing other than ordinary course 
trade credit. This is particularly true when one notes that other than 
credit granted under section 364(d),111 all of the priorities that can be 
granted to a creditor under section 364 would have been available to the 
involuntary debtor for granting to creditors outside of bankruptcy.112 
107. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12) (defining "debtor"), 1101(1) (defining "debtor-in-posses-
sion") (1988). 
108. Roxy Roller, 73 B.R. at 527. 
109. Id. 
110. The debtor cannot utilize § 364(a), as outlined supra, because its power to oper-
ate does not derive from §§ 721 or 1108 of the Code, as required by § 364(a). It is conceded 
that the debtor's ability to operate comes from § 303(f), not from either §§ 1108 or 721. This 
concession is made at least in part in recognition of the conflict, noted by the Roxy Roller 
court, between the priority accorded !Jrdinary course unsecured claims pursuant to §§ 364(n) 
and· 507(a)(l) and that accorded "gap period" ordinary course unsecured claims pursuant to 
§§ 502(f) and 507(a)(2). This conflict is unavoidable, as § 364(a)/507(a)(l) expenses are a 
subset of § 502(f) expenses. Roxy Roller, 73 B.R. at 526. 
111. This credit would have been available as well, through the use of a subordination 
agreement. However, the other types of credit available under § 364 would likely have been 
available without creditor consent. 
112. Section 364(c)(l) credit is also not available on an nonconsensual basis, i.e., with-
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Consequently, the denial of the use of section 364(b), (c), and (d)113 to 
involuntary debtors would completely cut off all normally available fi-
nancing at the very time the involuntary bankruptcy filing has dramati-
cally increased the debtor's need for financing.114 
The foregoing analysis presents at least one conceptual difficulty: it 
applies only to Chapter 11 cases. As noted previously, a debtor-in-posses-
sion is defined in Section 1101, which applies only to Chapter 11 cases.1111 
Further, a debtor-in-possession has the powers of a trustee pursuant to 
Section 1107, which again applies only in Chapter 11 cases.116 Chapter 7 
has no parallel provision that grants the Chapter 7 involuntary debtor the 
powers of a trustee.117 In an actual involuntary Chapter 7 case, a trustee 
is not appointed until an order for relief is entered.118 Consequently, an 
involuntary Chapter 7 debtor can never be a trustee, nor would a trustee 
automatically be appointed during the "gap period" of an involuntary 
Chapter 7 case, and thus it would seem that an involuntary Chapter 7 
debtor could not borrow under any part of section 364, even under our 
analysis. 
Despite the foregoing, a Chapter 7 involuntary debtor can access sec-
tion 364 by taking one of two possible additional steps. First, an involun-
out a subordination agreement from all other unsecured creditors, outside of bankruptcy. 
However, such credit is not likely to be utilized to a significant extent by those lending to 
involuntary debtors for, if such debtors are successful in fending off the bankruptcy, such a 
priority will be meaningless. 
113. Given this potential unfairness, one might wonder why the Code does not allow 
the involuntary debtor to obtain credit under § 364(a) as well. However, the division of § 
364 into the two portions that we suggest has further support in logic and reason, even in 
light of the above-mentioned unfairness. This is because §§ 364(b), (c), and (d) require court 
approval; § 364(a) does not. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(a)-(d) (1988). This division, coupled with 
the priority allowed under §§ 502(f) and 507(a)(2), allows the involuntary debtor to obtain 
financing for its ordinary course debts with a second priority and all other financing under 
the watchful eye of the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(f), 507(a)(2) (1988). This 
division allows the involuntary debtor significant flexibility to fulfill its cash needs without 
allowing it complete freedom to obtain financing in the period before an order for relief is 
entered. Further, according only a second priority for ordinary course expenses during the 
"gap period" should not have a significant effect on the involuntary debtor's trade credit, 
provided that the involuntary debtor can convince its creditors that the petition will ulti-
mately be dismissed, and thus Code priorities will be of no significance. 
114. The Roxy Roller opinion sets out another conceptual difficulty with concluding 
that an involuntary debtor is a trustee for purposes of § 364. See Roxy Roller, 73 B.R. 521. 
If she is a "trustee" for purposes of § 364, then the involuntary debtor is also a "trustee" for 
purposes of the avoiding powers such as the preference provision of § 547. Although the 
filing of an involuntary petition does trigger the Section 547 time periods, we are not com-
fortable with the idea of an involuntary debtor avoiding a transfer before an order for relief 
on the petition. We assume that bankruptcy judges will be at least as uncomfortable with 
the idea and, in the unlikely event that an involuntary debtor filed an avoidance action 
during the gap period, the judge would act on the involuntary petition before acting on the 
avoidance action. 
115. 11 u.s.c. § 103(f) (1988). 
116. 11 u.s.c. § 103(f) (1988). 
117. The absence of a parallel Chapter 7 provision is due most likely to the automatic 
appointment of an interim trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). 
118. Id. 
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tary Chapter 7 debtor can move to convert the case to a Chapter 11 
case, 119 opening up the availability of credit. Although conversion does 
cause an order for relief to be entered,120 the involuntary debtor can al-
ways move to dismiss the case for "cause" after the conversion.121 Alter-
natively, if the involuntary debtor is unwilling to seek conversion, it can 
still obtain section 364 financing by first seeking the appointment of an 
interim trustee under section 303(g). Under this section, a party in inter-
est may request the appointment of an interim trustee to "preserve the 
property of the estate or to prevent loss to the estate."122 To obtain 
postpetition financing in an involuntary case, it will often be necessary to 
preserve the property of the estate, so an interim trustee might be availa-
ble for that reason. An interim trustee would have the powers of a perma-
nent trustee123 and the appointment of such a trustee would not remove 
the debtor's ability to contest the petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The ability of prepackaged debtors to lock in financing and the abil-
ity of involuntary debtors to take advantage of section 364 both present 
interesting questions for financial institutions of statutory interpretation 
and bankruptcy policy in the important area of postpetition financing. 
We hope that we have shed some light on the answers to those questions. 
APPENDIX A 
Priorities* 
I. Primary Liens-section 364(d) 
II. Secured Claims (to value of collateral)-Section 506(a) 
III. Superpriority Claims-Section 364(c) 
IV. Administrative Claims-Section 507(a)(l) and 503(b) 
V. "Gap Period" Claims-Section 507(a)(2) and 502(f) 
VI. Unsecured Claims (including deficiencies in Secured Claims) -Sec-
tion 506(a) 
VII. Interests 
*General overview-some priorities omitted 
119. 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1988) (providing an absolute right to convert a Chapter 7 case 
to a Chapter 11 case, provided the case has not already been converted to a Chapter 7 case). 
120. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1988). 
121. 11 u.s.c. § 1112(b) (1988). 
122. 11 u.s.c. § 303(g) (1988). 
123. 11 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1988). 
